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Abstract 
There is growing evidence that self-affirmation – the process of reflecting upon 
cherished values or attributes – may have implications for health. Postulated effects 
range from reducing the defensive resistance to unwelcome health-risk information to 
ameliorating the physiological response to stress. In this, the first detailed review of 
the literature on self-affirmation and health, we summarise what is known. Self-
affirming can increase acceptance of unwelcome health-risk information, especially 
among those at greatest risk. Self-affirmed participants typically also report more 
intention to change behaviour post-message. There is evidence that certain effects of 
self-affirming may endure. Self-affirmation has also been shown to have beneficial 
effects on the response to stress. There is, however, currently only limited evidence of 
actual health behaviour change following self-affirmation. We discuss reasons for this 
and consider key research questions for the next phase of research. 
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Despite decades of attempts to encourage people to adopt healthier lifestyles by, for 
example, taking more exercise, eating healthily, and drinking alcohol only in 
moderation, rates of obesity, heart disease and other chronic “diseases of lifestyle” 
continue to rise worldwide. This has led to a redoubling of efforts to encourage those 
whose behaviour puts them at risk of future ill health to change their behaviour. 
However, many such appeals fall at the first hurdle; they fail to persuade. There is 
considerable evidence that people – especially those most at risk – resist attempts to 
persuade them of the need to change. Responses range from simply trying to avoid or 
ignore material containing unwelcome information to finding grounds to reject it by 
paying it close critical attention (Blumberg, 2000; Jacks & Cameron, 2003). Such 
strategies achieve short-term benefits, such as reducing anxiety or the perceived need 
to make effortful and time-consuming changes (Leventhal, 1970), but at the risk of 
costs to health and life expectancy.  
Traditionally, message advocates respond to such resistance by refining the 
message, perhaps by tailoring it to particular subgroups of respondents, providing 
personalised data or encouraging the use of imagery and affect (Cameron & Chan, 
2008; Dijkstra, 2008). One long-established method is to attempt to elicit in the target 
audience a strong negative emotional reaction, such as fear, at the future health 
consequences of maintaining current behaviour, as some degree of threat or fear is 
seen as a precursor to taking action (Witte, 1992); however, fear can enhance as well 
as reduce resistance (Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001). Other approaches involve 
persuading people that the targeted behaviour is feasible as well as desirable (Ruiter, 
et al., 2001). The goal of all of these attempts is to persuade those who are at risk of 
the need to change and to increase their motivation to try.  
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This paper reviews evidence concerning a method – self-affirmation – that takes a 
different approach to the problem of promoting motivation to change. Rather than 
requiring changes to persuasive materials, self-affirming – which involves reflecting 
upon one’s important values or cherished attributes – is hypothesised to promote more 
open-minded and balanced appraisal of existing materials. Self-affirmation theory 
(Steele, 1988) provides both a theoretical framework for understanding why people 
may resist unwelcome but potentially vital information and suggests methods for 
overcoming such resistance. It is, therefore, of both theoretical and applied relevance. 
Recent reviews (Aronson, Cohen & Nail, 1999; McQueen & Klein, 2006; 
Sherman & Cohen, 2006) have presented evidence that self-affirming reduces biased 
responding to uncongenial information in a wide range of domains. However, as yet 
no review has been specifically devoted to its impact on health and health-related 
cognition and behaviour, even though enough evidence has now accumulated to 
justify a review of what we know and an appraisal of what we need to find out. In 
this, the first of two companion papers, we therefore provide an up to date summary 
of the published literature on self-affirmation and health-related responding, focussing 
on two key questions: (1) does self-affirming increase acceptance of relevant health-
risk information, (2) subsequently, do self-affirmed participants show greater interest 
in, motivation for and likelihood of behaviour change? This review is intended to 
provide the specialist reader with a detailed summary of the literature suitable for 
their purposes and the non-specialist reader with a grounding in the state of the 
literature on the health effects of self-affirming.  
Self-Affirmation Theory 
Self-affirming is the process of reflecting upon one’s cherished values, actions or 
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what they stand for in the face of perceived threats to their identity. It can be used to 
defend against forthcoming identity threats (much like a psychological “inoculation”) 
or to repair damage caused by threats that have already occurred (Sherman & Cohen, 
2006).  
At the heart of Self-Affirmation Theory is the notion of “self-integrity”, defined 
by the theory’s author, Claude Steele, as the experience of the self as “adaptively and 
morally adequate” (Steele, 1988, p. 262). The theory is explicitly motivational. It 
proposes that people are strongly motivated to maintain self-integrity. This is relevant 
to health information (such as health warnings) because, according to the theory, 
people often perceive such information as threatening their sense of being moral, 
competent and worthy (self-integrity). 
People respond to such threats in various ways. For example, a smoker who 
experiences a threat to her self-integrity from information about the health risks of 
smoking might resist potential harm by denigrating the information or making 
renewed attempts to quit. These responses would have very different implications for 
her subsequent health behaviour, but equivalent consequences for her immediate 
sense of self-integrity (as both, in different ways, reduce the perceived threat). 
However, Self-Affirmation Theory identifies a third path to threat reduction. Here, 
self-integrity is restored by affirming sources of self-worth that are important to the 
person’s identity but unrelated to the threat. For example, the smoker may remind 
herself of her strengths as a mother or agree to take part in a time-consuming act of 
charity (Steele, 1975). Consequently, in the context of other valued self-concepts, 
being a smoker becomes less threatening to her self-integrity. This is not a process of 
distraction but a means of “offsetting” or balancing the threat to self-integrity from 
the health-risk information by affirming some other, at least equally important, aspect 
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of identity. This is possible, according to Self-Affirmation Theory, because people are 
concerned primarily with maintaining their overall sense of self-integrity rather than 
resolving each and every provoking threat (Steele, 1988).  
An intriguing consequence of this flexibility in response to psychological threat is 
that salient, self-affirming thoughts should reduce the pressure to diminish the threat 
in other self-threatening information and thereby promote the ability to think 
objectively (Steele, 1988, p. 290). That is, someone who self-affirms has available to 
them the perspective and resources to better confront a self-threat (Sherman & Cohen, 
2006).  
The hypothesis that self-affirming can promote more objective appraisal of 
(otherwise) threatening material has obvious appeal to researchers interested in 
persuasion in the health domain, where the messages typically contain important but 
unwelcome information and resistance is common, especially among more at-risk 
groups (Freeman, Hennessy, & Marzullo, 2001; Kunda, 1987; Liberman & Chaiken, 
1992). Self-affirmation manipulations raise the intriguing prospect of removing an 
important early obstacle to health behaviour change.  
Self-affirmation and health 
As a theory for understanding and promoting health-behaviour change, Self-
Affirmation Theory is a relative newcomer; it was some 10 years after Steele’s article 
that the first empirical paper testing whether it promoted greater objectivity in the 
health domain was published (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). Recent years have seen 
growing interest; using procedures similar to those employed by McQueen and Klein 
(2006) we found 18 published and in press papers comprising 22 studies testing the 
effects of self-affirming on health-related cognition, affect and behaviour.  
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Most of the articles use a common “two-study” paradigm in which participants are 
randomly assigned to self-affirm or to a control condition and then subsequently 
exposed to health-risk information, typically in the guise of an unrelated experiment. 
Indeed, it appears to be critical to the effectiveness of self-affirming that participants 
are unaware of the effects of self-affirming on their subsequent judgments and 
therefore of the link between the two studies (Sherman, Cohen et al., in press). This is 
one key way in which self-affirming as used here differs from self-affirming as 
popularly understood as a means of explicitly boosting self-regard (Sherman, Cohen 
et al., in press).  
The dominant paradigm therefore involves testing the preventive or prophylactic 
effects of self-affirming, as participants have yet to be made aware of the threat (the 
health-risk information) when they self-affirm. Given its inherent flexibility, there are 
many ways of self-affirming (Steele, 1988). Some are esteem based (for example, 
providing bogus feedback on a test; Steele, Spencer & Lynch, 1993). However, most 
of the studies reviewed here have used some version of a values exercise in which 
those in the self-affirmed condition reflect upon a core value (e.g., by completing a 
relevant values scale or writing a brief essay on their most important value) whereas 
control participants complete a less relevant values scale or write about why their 
least important value might be important to someone else. (For more on methods of 
self-affirming, see McQueen & Klein, 2006.) Self-affirmation manipulations are 
designed to (1) make a central and positive aspect of the self-concept salient, (2) 
provide a reminder of “who you are” and (3) offer reassurance that self-worth can be 
derived from other aspects of the self than the threatened one (Napper, Harris & 
Epton, 2008; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). 
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Messages have occasionally communicated fictitious health-risks (e.g., Crocker, 
Niiya & Mischkowski, 2008) but have mainly targeted genuine health threats. The 
health-risk information is typically a persuasive message (presented as articles, 
leaflets, images or by video) designed to threaten at-risk participants, who are 
expected to respond to it in a biased way by, for example, showing less acceptance of 
the message or its personal relevance (Table 1). Because this response typically serves 
to lessen the threat, it is often described as “defensive” (Good & Abraham, 2007). 
Researchers assume that self-affirming has reduced defensiveness when at-risk, self-
affirmed participants show more evidence of accepting or responding to the message 
than their non-affirmed counterparts. In most studies researchers also assume the 
message was threatening from this difference in response, rather than measuring 
threat direct.  
As used here, at-risk describes a property of the individual as, for example, judged 
by an impartial assessment of the risks involved in their behaviour, such as their 
reported alcohol or cigarette consumption. Whether the individual shares this 
perception is a different matter; downplaying personal relevance or susceptibility is a 
common defensive strategy. Indeed, based on the above theorising, one effect of self-
affirming should be to improve the correspondence between risk assessments and 
personal judgments.  
In terms of Self-Affirmation Theory, the predicted beneficial effects of self-
affirming are clear (and potentially limited to) those who should find the message 
threatening (i.e., at-risk participants). However, this raises difficulties when 
interpreting null effects, as failure to obtain significant effects of self-affirmation may 
stem from (1) a lack of defensiveness among non-affirmed participants (2) the 
arguments being weak or otherwise unpersuasive (3) insufficient power to detect 
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effects or (4) failure of the manipulation to induce self-affirmation. As few studies 
include manipulation checks (because completing these may induce self-affirmation 
in control participants – McQueen & Klein, 2006; Schwinghammer, Stapel & 
Blanton, 2006) identifying manipulation failure is a potential problem. However, the 
authors of only two published studies – Fry and Prentice-Dunn (2005) and Dillard, 
McCaul and Magnan (2005) – interpret their findings as failures. Note also that self-
affirmation is hypothesised to induce more open-minded appraisal, not persuasion: it 
should therefore lead to rejection of weak or irrelevant information. It is not thought 
to work by trivialising the threat (e.g., Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & 
Dijksterhuis, 1999) or increasing suggestibility (e.g., Correll, Spencer & Zanna, 
2004).  
In part one we review the current published literature that has assessed how self-
affirming affects the acceptance and processing of health-risk information and, in part 
two, interest in and likelihood of relevant health-behaviour change. In addition, 
researchers have begun to assess the potential effects of self-affirming on responses to 
stress and other health-related processes and we review that research here too.   
Part one: message acceptance 
Overall, there is good evidence that self-affirming promotes greater general and 
personal acceptance of health-risk information, and less message derogation.   
Researchers have used direct questions (e.g., “to what extent do you think the 
conclusion of the article was justified on the basis of existing research findings?”, 
Crocker, et al., 2008) or inferred acceptance from belief items (e.g., “I believe that 
women should take steps to reduce their daily caffeine consumption in order to 
prevent the development of [Fibrocystic Breast Disease]”, Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). 
Self-affirming increases acceptance on such measures: for example, among coffee 
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drinkers reading about the health risks of caffeine (Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 2000; 
van Koningsbruggen, Das & Roskos-Ewoldsen, in press) and smokers responding to 
information about established (Armitage, Harris, Napper & Hepton, 2008) or 
fictitious health risks of smoking (Crocker et al., 2008). However, some studies have 
not found effects on such measures (Dillard, et al. 2005; Harris & Napper, 2005).  
Studies have also shown that self-affirming reduces message derogation: after 
self-affirming, sunbathing women rated a leaflet about skin cancer and sun safety as 
less overblown, exaggerated, manipulative, and straining the truth (Jessop, Simmonds 
& Sparks, 2009) and at-risk participants rated a message about type 2 diabetes as 
being less distorted, exaggerated, and too extreme (van Koningsbruggen & Das, in 
press).  
However, agreeing a hazard exists is one thing; accepting it is personally relevant 
is another. Indeed, accepting that health-risk information is personally relevant is seen 
as an important step towards changing behaviour (Weinstein, 1988). There is 
evidence that self-affirmed people are more prepared to take this step: after self-
affirming, females rated their sexual experience as significantly more similar to those 
in an AIDS video than did non-affirmed females or either group of men (Sherman et 
al., 2000), heavier drinkers reported more easily imagining themselves experiencing 
breast cancer from alcohol (Harris & Napper, 2005), and smokers reported graphic 
on-pack smoking warnings to be more personally relevant  (Harris, Mayle, Mabbott & 
Napper, 2007) than did than did their non-affirmed counterparts. In Napper, Harris 
and Epton (2009) self-affirmed heavier drinking female students rated a message 
about breast cancer and alcohol as being just as relevant to them as to the average 
student, whereas their non-affirmed counterparts rated it as marginally more relevant 
to the average student.  
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Self-affirming has also resulted in increased self-risk perceptions: after relevant 
messages Sherman et al. (2000) found higher self-risk judgments for HIV and Harris 
and Napper (2005) for breast cancer from alcohol in self-affirmed than non-affirmed 
participants. In contrast, Harris et al. (2007) found no effect of self-affirmation on 
self-risk judgments for smoking-related diseases among smokers shown the on-pack 
warnings. (However, non-affirmed smokers showed evidence of defensiveness on 
most other measures in this study, suggesting that the risk judgments may not have 
been sensitive.) Self-affirming has also been shown to reduce the extent to which 
participants view their chances of experiencing future negative health consequences 
as being lower than comparable others (Klein, Blier & Janze, 2001; Napper et al., 
2009; Sherman, Cohen, et al., in press; see Harris & Napper, 2005, for an exception). 
Affect 
A key motive in rejecting health-risk information is to control the negative affect, 
such as fear and anxiety, it engenders. Prioritising such “fear control” may undermine 
“danger control” or the taking of action to reduce the risk (Leventhal, 1970; Witte, 
1992). Self-affirmed participants have reported more negative affect after health 
information (Harris & Napper, 2005; Harris et al., 2007; Jessop et al., 2009) 
suggesting less fear control. Whether self-affirmation increases the experience of 
negative affect or enhances the accuracy with which people report their affective 
experience (or both) is, however, unclear. 
Given the nature of Self-Affirmation Theory, surprisingly few published studies 
have included measures of self-threat (such as items denoting negative self-feelings, 
Dijkstra, De Vries, Kok & Roijackers, 1999) or self-directed positive affect (Tesser, 
2000). In Sherman et al. (2000) self-affirming prior to threat boosted ratings on a self-
feeling item (study 1); Jessop et al. (2009) found less positive ratings on the same 
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item among self-affirmed sunbathers after the leaflet, supporting the hypothesis that 
positive self-feeling is a resource expended when facing threat (Reed & Aspinwall, 
1998; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002). Recently, Crocker et al. (2008) showed that 
feelings of love and connectedness, rather than measures of positive or negative self-
directed feelings, mediated the effects of a values manipulation on smoker’s 
acceptance of fictitious information about a health risk of smoking. Clearly Crocker et 
al.’s findings are potentially very significant, with implications for Self-Affirmation 
Theory as a whole, but require replication, not least because the researchers used a 
general rather than personal measure of message acceptance, a small sample (N = 27) 
of relatively light smokers and single item measures of emotion that may be 
unreliable.  
Message processing 
At present, very little published material offers insights into how self-affirming 
affects the processing of health-risk information, despite the key hypothesis that it 
promotes greater open-mindedness; researchers have focussed more on demonstrating 
its effects on outcome measures like acceptance. Nevertheless, the methods used in 
some studies offer possible insights into how self-affirming changes the person’s 
approach to and processing of the threatening elements of the material. However, 
most findings await replication. 
Reed and Aspinwall separated their message – about the risks of fibrocystic 
disease (FBD) from caffeine – into risk-confirming, risk-disconfirming and neutral 
passages. Self-affirmed participants rated the risk-confirming passage as significantly 
more convincing than the risk disconfirming passage; non-affirmed participants rated 
both as equally (and relatively) convincing. Although this may signal less 
defensiveness after self-affirming, the passages had been piloted to be of equal 
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strength, so the self-affirmed group may have been unduly critical of the risk 
disconfirming passage rather than unbiased.  
In open-ended responses coded in Dillard et al. (2005), non-smokers saw on-pack, 
anti-smoking warnings as being more likely to be effective than did non-affirmed 
smokers, but not than did self-affirmed smokers, suggesting less defensiveness among 
self-affirmed smokers. In Napper et al. (2009, study 3) self-affirmed (but not non 
affirmed) participants made significantly more statements coded as accepting than 
denying personal relevance when reading the alcohol and breast cancer message, 
again suggesting less defensiveness among self-affirmed participants. 
In van Koningsbruggen et al. (in press) self-affirmed coffee drinkers were quicker 
than non-affirmed coffee drinkers to respond to threat-related words taken from a 
message they had read about the effects of caffeine on health, suggesting self-
affirming increased the accessibility of threat-related cognitions. Similarly, in Klein 
and Harris (in press) moderately heavy female drinkers who were self-affirmed 
showed an attentional bias towards threatening words taken from an article linking 
alcohol to breast cancer. In contrast, their non-affirmed counterparts showed a bias 
away from these words (suggesting avoidance). Importantly, no attentional biases 
appeared for threat words not in the message, suggesting the effect was threat-
specific.   
The above findings indicate greater readiness to embrace risk confirming or 
threatening material among self-affirmed participants and suggest that this material 
may be more cognitively accessible to them. There is some evidence that self-
affirming does not, however, alter the time people spend reading or overall tone of 
their thinking. In Reed and Aspinwall (1998) self-affirmed, higher caffeine-
consuming women spent the least time overall reading and their non-affirmed 
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counterparts the most (but only in statistically liberal one-tailed tests of planned 
comparisons); moreover, other studies have found no differences between affirmed 
and non-affirmed participants in reading times (Dillard et al., 2005; Epton & Harris, 
2008). In both Sherman et al. (2000) and Napper et al. (2009) self-affirming did not 
affect the overall valence of the thoughts participants listed after reading information. 
Self-affirming may increase readiness to confront threat and influence what is 
recalled: Self-affirmed, higher caffeine consuming women in Reed and Aspinwall 
(1998) navigated their way to the more threatening (risk confirming) material more 
than twice as quickly as their non-affirmed counterparts; however, it is not clear 
whether this was because they felt readier to confront the threat or because they spent 
less time reading previous passages (see above). In planned comparisons, non-
affirmed, higher consuming women in Reed and Aspinwall (1998) recalled more risk-
disconfirming information after one week than their self-affirmed counterparts (and 
all other groups combined), perhaps suggesting self-affirming reduced a tendency to 
recall congenial information. No such differences emerged in analyses of the risk 
confirming information, despite the longer time the non-affirmed, higher consuming 
women spent reading it. However, Dillard et al. (2005) found no differences in recall 
of the warnings between smokers in their affirmed and non-affirmed conditions. 
Clearly, these data are limited and hard to interpret. Much more data are needed 
about how self-affirming affects the processing of health-risk information by at-risk 
participants.  
Where next? 
Evidence supports the hypothesis that self-affirmed participants are readier to accept 
uncongenial health-risk information. The evidence ranges across indices of both 
general and personal message acceptance, affect and message processing. 
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Nevertheless, there is considerable scope for more research on how self-affirming 
affects the processing of health-risk information. In particular, currently little is 
known about how self-affirming promotes open-mindedness. Indeed, this appears to 
be a limitation of the area as a whole. Investigators have offered a range of plausible 
mediators including mood, state self-esteem, confidence, and self-certainty, but no 
consistent mediators have emerged across studies (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Health-
related studies have tested whether self-affirming boosts ratings of general mood 
(e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005; Sherman et al., 2000) and found that it does not, which 
is consistent with studies of self-affirming more generally (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; 
however, see Tesser, 2000). The findings of Crocker et al. (2008) regarding the 
mediating role of other-related affect, notably feelings of loving and connectedness, 
extend the list of potential mediators and pose an interesting challenge to Self-
Affirmation Theory. Crocker et al. claim that value affirmation works precisely 
because it reminds people about what they care about beyond themselves and it is this 
that enables them to “transcend the self, reducing defensiveness” (p. 6). (See also 
Chen & Boucher, 2008, for a discussion of the role of significant others as self-
affirmational resources.) The notion that self-affirming boosts confidence and self-
certainty is intuitively appealing, has some empirical basis and has been used to 
explain both beneficial and detrimental effects of self-affirming (Brinol, Petty, 
Gallardo, & DeMarree, 2007; Klein, Blier & Janze, 2001; Sherman & Cohen, 2006), 
so also appears to show some promise, but is currently under-researched. 
Understanding how self-affirming promotes open-mindedness remains a key 
challenge for self-affirmation researchers. The literature would also benefit from 
examining when and how self-affirming affects mode of information processing (e.g., 
Chaiken, Gina-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). 
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Part two: Interest in health behaviour change 
Resistance to unwelcome information is an important obstacle to changing behaviour; 
when this resistance is reduced by self-affirming, are at-risk participants more 
inclined towards changing their behaviour?  
Most models of behaviour change identify a summary index of readiness to 
perform the behaviour  – typically intentions – as pivotal to the process (Conner & 
Norman, 2005). From this perspective, establishing that self-affirmed, at-risk 
participants show positive changes in intentions post-message is key to assessing its 
potential role in health behaviour change. Naturally, therefore, researchers have 
looked for changes both in intentions and the predictors of intentions as identified in 
these models (Table 1). Intriguingly, while there is good evidence for positive 
changes in intentions, evidence for changes on predictors is more mixed, perhaps 
because to date relatively few studies have examined each predictor.  
Predictors of intentions 
In Jessop et al. (2009) self-affirmed sunbathers had more positive attitudes towards 
sunscreen use than did non-affirmed sunbathers; However, Harris and Napper (2005) 
found no effect of self-affirming on attitude towards cutting down on alcohol.  
Self-affirmed, higher caffeine consumers in Reed and Aspinwall (1998) had the 
same level of perceived control over reducing caffeine consumption as lower users; 
non-affirmed participants’ control ratings were lower, suggesting that self-affirming 
buffered or raised control perceptions. In Harris et al. (2007) perceived behavioural 
control (PBC) over cutting down on cigarettes was higher among self-affirmed 
smokers; however, in Harris and Napper (2005) self-affirming did not affect PBC 
over cutting down on alcohol. Ratings of self-efficacy (perceived ability to enact the 
recommended behaviour) were higher among self-affirmed participants in the three 
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published studies that have measured it (Epton & Harris, 2008; Harris et al., 2007; 
Jessop et al., 2009).  
The belief that adopting the recommended behaviour will reduce risk has been 
used to measure message acceptance (see part one). As “response-efficacy”, this 
belief is also used to predict intentions. Epton and Harris (2008) specifically 
attempted to promote response efficacy in their message and found it was higher 
subsequently in the self-affirmed group. In Jessop et al. (2009) self-affirming boosted 
response efficacy among sunbathers not using sunscreen, suggesting that it enhanced 
the persuasive effect of their message for this group. In Fry and Prentice-Dunn (2005) 
women were exposed to a vivid message about breast cancer and then either received 
or did not receive information about the effectiveness of breast self-examination. Self-
affirmation moderated the impact of effectiveness information on response-efficacy. 
However, it is not clear whether self-affirmation enhanced its impact or not (as the 
means are unavailable).  
Other studies have shown no effects of self-affirming on other predictors of 
intentions. Dillard et al. (2005) found no effects of self-affirming on ratings of the 
seriousness of the risks of smoking after the on-pack warnings. (However, mean 
seriousness was high, suggesting possible ceiling effects.) Napper et al. (2009) found 
no effects of condition on thoughts coded as taking the message seriously or 
minimising the issue among female drinkers reading their alcohol leaflet. Harris and 
Napper (2005) found no effect of self-affirmation on subjective norm (the perception 
of what important others, such as family or friends, would like you to do).  
Intentions 
What about intentions themselves? Reed and Aspinwall (1998) were the first to report 
whether self-affirming promoted healthier intentions and the results were surprising: 
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despite appearing to accept the message more, higher consuming, self-affirmed 
participants reported lower intentions to cut down on caffeine than their non-affirmed 
counterparts. This finding remains a puzzle, not least because subsequent studies have 
typically found that self-affirming does promote healthier intentions among those at 
risk (Armitage et al., 2008; Harris et al., 2007; Harris & Napper, 2005; Sherman et al., 
2000, study 1; van Koningsbruggen & Das, in press; van Koningsbruggen, et al., in 
press; though see Fry & Prentice-Dunn, 2005 for an exception). In other studies this 
difference has approached significance (Epton & Harris, 2008) or was higher in 
planned contrasts between self-affirmed groups and the non-affirmed one (Jessop et 
al., 2009). In two smoking studies, however, non-affirmed and affirmed smokers did 
not differ on some related measures, such as plans or motivation to quit (Dillard et al., 
2005; Harris et al., 2007).  
In Protection Motivation Theory (PMT, Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) intention 
is a measure of adaptive coping to be considered alongside measures of maladaptive 
coping, like avoidance or feelings of hopelessness. Fry and Prentice-Dunn (2005) 
found that self-affirmed women with no experience of breast cancer (such as a friend 
or relative with the disease) reported trying to avoid thinking about the threat less and 
had lower ratings of hopelessness after the breast cancer message. In Napper et al. 
(2009) self-affirmed women reported thinking deeply about the alcohol and breast 
cancer message more than trying not to think about it, whereas non-affirmed 
participants did not. However, Jessop et al. (2009) found no effects of self-affirming 
on an item measuring wanting not to think about skin cancer. 
Immediate and subsequent health-related behaviour 
It is a commonplace that good intentions are not inevitably translated into relevant 
behaviour. So, what evidence is there for positive effects of self-affirming on actual 
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health behaviour? Overall, there is good evidence that self-affirming leads to 
increases in immediate behaviour consistent with expressed intentions, but only one 
study to date has reported any longer term differences in health behaviour between 
self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants.  
Self-affirmed participants in Sherman et al. (2000, study 2) took more leaflets 
about HIV and purchased more condoms than did non-affirmed participants. In 
Armitage et al. (2008) more self-affirmed than non-affirmed smokers in a factory took 
leaflets giving advice on how to quit. Jessop et al. (2009) offered sunbathers a free 
sample of sunscreen. Acceptance varied by condition: 40.5% (control), 35% (kindness 
affirmation), 54.8% (values affirmation) and 63.2% (positive traits) with the 
difference between the positive traits and control conditions achieving statistical 
significance. In van Koningsbruggen and Das (in press) self-affirming increased the 
number of at-risk participants who clicked on an ostensible link to an online test for 
type 2 diabetes and decreased the number of those not at risk who did so, suggesting 
greater readiness to take the test in the at-risk group.  
In contrast, there is much less evidence of longer-term health behaviour change 
following persuasion induced by self-affirmation, even though self-affirming has been 
shown to promote behaviour in non-health domains: for example, Cohen, Garcia, 
Apfel, and Master (2006) found increases in the grades of minority school students in 
the semester after a self-affirmation manipulation. Yet in the health domain Reed and 
Aspinwall (1998) found no differences in participants’ reported caffeine consumption 
1 week post-manipulation, Harris and Napper (2005) no differences in participants’ 
self-reported alcohol consumption 1 week or 1 month post-manipulation, and Harris 
et al. (2007) no differences in cigarette consumption 1 week post-manipulation. 
Recently, however, Epton and Harris (2008) found that self-affirmed participants 
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reported eating significantly more portions of fruit and vegetables for seven days 
following the manipulation than did non-affirmed participants. Interestingly, they 
achieved this by focussing on a health promoting behaviour (diet) rather than the 
health damaging behaviours targeted previously and by emphasising response- and 
self-efficacy alongside threat in their message. It may be that these changes removed 
some obstacles to translating intentions into behaviour (Epton & Harris, 2008). 
Clearly, much more research is needed on the longer term consequences of self-
affirming for health behaviour and, in particular, on the reasons why the apparent 
readiness for health behaviour change expressed in intentions has not typically 
manifested itself in subsequent change. However, this is certainly not a problem 
unique to this literature: There are many reasons why people with good intentions fail 
to translate these into behaviour (Sheeran, 2002) and there are currently no theoretical 
reasons for expecting the intentions formed after self-affirming to be more successful 
at overcoming this intention-behaviour gap. Indeed, some researchers (e.g., 
Schwarzer, 1992) differentiate motivational or goal-setting processes, such as 
intention formation, from the volitional or goal-striving processes by which people 
strive to translate intentions into behaviour, arguing that the processes involved are 
different. It may be best to consider self-affirmation to be a motivational manipulation 
– in that it encourages motivation to change in response to a strong message – until 
such time as theoretical developments or empirical evidence suggest otherwise. We 
consider this issue further in the companion paper. 
In this light, evidence that motivation after self-affirming is sustained is 
encouraging. For example, in Harris and Napper (2005) vulnerability perceptions 
about breast cancer from alcohol remained higher one month later. In Harris et al. 
(2007) motivation to reduce consumption was higher in self-affirmed smokers one 
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week later (following declines in non-affirmed smokers’ motivation). Likewise, the 
behaviour change in Epton and Harris (2008) was relatively sustained: self-affirmed 
participants reported eating more fruit and vegetables than non-affirmed participants 
everyday including the seventh day after the manipulation. This may be all we should 
reasonably expect of a self-affirmation manipulation that has not been bolstered in 
some way (e.g., with procedures known to reduce the intention-behaviour gap, such 
as plans for implementing intentions, Sheeran, Milne, Webb & Gollwitzer, 2005). 
Moderation of effects by risk level 
What evidence is there that the beneficial effects of self-affirming are more 
pronounced among those at greater risk? Such evidence is particularly significant, as 
such respondents are the most in need of change and yet often the hardest to persuade. 
In Harris and Napper (2005) the impact of self-affirmation on risk, imagination, 
negative affect, and intentions was most pronounced among heavier drinkers. In both 
Harris et al. (2007) and Armitage et al. (2008) the impact of self-affirmation on 
measures of message acceptance and intentions was greater among higher and 
moderate than lighter smokers. In van Koningsbruggen and Das (in press) self-
affirmation reduced message derogation and raised intentions and likelihood of 
clicking the link to the diabetes test among those at higher risk, and lowered 
intentions and likelihood of clicking the link among those at lower risk. This is 
noteworthy as participants may have a less clear sense of their personal risk in this 
situation than when thinking about their relative levels of alcohol or cigarette 
consumption. However, in Epton and Harris (2008) baseline consumption did not 
moderate the effects of condition and the interaction effect on intentions was not 
significant (p = .10). Moreover, in Klein and Harris (in press) the effects of self-
affirming on attentional bias were found in moderate but not heavy drinkers. Indeed, 
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van Koningsbruggen (2009) has recently argued that the benefits of self-affirming are 
limited to moderate levels of threat and that it promotes less rather than more 
objectivity when threat is high or low. This claim has significant theoretical and 
applied implications but awaits detailed empirical examination.  
Overall, therefore, there is some encouraging evidence of moderation by risk 
level, but also some inconsistencies. Moreover, where moderation has occurred it has 
affected some but not all of the measures and we currently have no theoretical 
insights as to why.  
Direct effects on stress and health 
Evidence is accumulating that, as well as indirect effects via healthier behaviour, self-
affirming has the potential for more direct effects on health – such as by affecting the 
physiological response to stress. Self-affirming has been shown to reduce salivary 
cortisol (Cresswell, et al., 2005) and to buffer epinephrine levels (Sherman, Bunyan, 
Creswell & Jaremka, in press) during and after stress. It has also been shown to 
reduce rumination (Koole, et al., 1999; Koole & van Knippenberg, 2007), which may 
also have implications for the experience of stress (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Self-
affirming has also been implicated in the beneficial effects of expressive writing, with 
the number of self-affirming statements made in essays by early stage breast cancer 
survivors mediating the reductions in physical symptoms they reported three months 
later (Cresswell, et al., 2006). Crocker et al. (2008) speculate that self-affirming may 
increase levels of oxytocin, a hormone that increases feelings of love and trust. 
Summary 
We started with two empirical questions: (1) does self-affirming increase acceptance 
of relevant health-risk information? (2) do self-affirmed participants subsequently 
show greater interest in, motivation for and likelihood of subsequent behaviour 
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change? The answer is a clear yes to question 1 but only a qualified yes to question 2, 
as evidence for actual behaviour change is currently limited.  
Overall, there is promising evidence that being required to self-affirm before 
receiving heath risk information can promote greater message acceptance and reduce 
active message derogation in those at risk. In the process, it can promote reports of 
more negative affect in response to the message. Few studies have examined whether 
self-affirming changes how people engage with the health-risk information, although 
it has been shown to affect the balance between thoughts accepting and denying 
personal relevance, to reduce the time taken to confront threatening information and 
to decrease recall of risk-disconfirming information. However, no published research 
has yet shown enhanced recall as a function of self-affirming and no clear pattern has 
emerged to date concerning its effects on time spent reading the information 
(although it has not been shown in published research so far to increase it). The 
positive effects of self-affirming extend to intentions and to behaviour in situ 
consistent with intentions. There is, however, currently only one published study 
showing actual health behaviour change following self-affirmation. Nevertheless, 
there is encouraging evidence that the positive effects of self-affirming may endure 
and can be most pronounced for those at greatest risk. The latter effect is potentially 
highly significant, not least because of the applied benefit in reaching such hard to 
persuade groups. As well as indirect effects on health via healthier behaviour, there is 
growing evidence that self-affirming may also have beneficial effects on health more 
directly by, for example, affecting the physiological response to stress.  
However, to date there are relatively few studies, so that even the most replicated 
effects of self-affirming on the response to heath risk information, such as on 
intentions, are based on only a handful of studies. There is a clear need for studies 
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simply to add to the existing evidence base. Studies employing process and implicit 
measures of cognition and affect in particular are so few as to significantly limit our 
current understanding of what happens when people self-affirm.  
Part three: Issues and limitations 
What happens to people when they self-affirm and why does this make them more 
open-minded? Does self-affirming result in genuine readiness to change and if so 
how? Relatively little progress has been made towards answering the two main 
process questions at the heart of this literature. With regard to the first – how self-
affirming promotes greater open-mindedness – while there are currently several 
promising leads for mediators (such as confidence and other-directed feelings), we 
currently know more about what does not appear to mediate the effects (e.g., explicit 
positive mood, boosts to state self-esteem, agreeableness) than what does. With 
regard to the second – how self-affirming influences the development of motivation 
for change – the question has hardly been asked. Does self-affirming simply influence 
acceptance, so that any effects on motivation for behaviour change stem from the 
changes – on key predictors of intentions – that naturally follow accepting a health 
message is important and personally relevant? Or are other processes introduced by 
the manipulations, such as direct effects of self-affirming on these predictors or even 
on intentions themselves? This is currently far from clear. We consider these 
questions in more detail in the companion paper.  
Why is there limited evidence of actual health behaviour change in self-
affirmation studies? Perhaps self-affirming induces motivation for change that is 
premature or unstable, because it is not fully thought through or the product of overly 
optimistic thinking. If so, then the intentions formed after self-affirming would lack 
the properties, such as temporal stability, known to be associated with successful 
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behaviour change (e.g., Cooke & Sheeran, 2004) and it would be no surprise that few 
studies have successfully demonstrated changes in behaviour. 
The existence of some evidence of longer-term behaviour change and of sustained 
motivation for change argues against this, of course, but the next wave of research 
needs to focus on this question and to assess the properties of the motivation formed 
after self-affirming. On the other hand, as Epton and Harris (2008) argued, the 
relative absence of behavioural effects may stem from the difficulty of changing the 
behaviours (e.g., alcohol consumption, cigarette smoking) targeted in most studies or 
a failure to provide clear behavioural targets, plans for implementing intentions, and 
other forms of behavioural support alongside the threat message. More studies should 
focus on the relative merits of balancing threat and efficacy components of the health-
risk information, of targeting health damaging or health promoting behaviours, and 
providing specific behavioural targets accompanied by techniques known to aid the 
translation of intentions into behaviour, such as implementation intentions (if-then 
plans specifying the situational context for enacting behaviour, Sheeran et al., 2005). 
Research that uses theoretical models to guide both the development of the message 
and the support offered to foster behaviour change would be particularly useful. In the 
process, the evidence base would benefit from extending the health-risk information 
from its current emphasis on one-sided, verbal, non-tailored persuasive messages to 
other forms of material, such as tailored information, personalised risk feedback and 
the results of health tests.  
Such research would assist both theory development and provide information 
about the potential for using self-affirming in interventions. Indeed, there are a 
number of limitations to the existing literature that need addressing before we can 
adequately assess the latter. Most published studies have involved groups of young 
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women, typically students, in Western countries (mainly the US, UK and 
Netherlands). There is some evidence that gender may moderate the effects of self-
affirming (Napper et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 2000) and more attention needs to be 
paid to gender differences. Although non-student samples have been used (e.g., 
Armitage, et al., 2008; Jessop, et al., 2009), if it is to have a role to play as an 
intervention, extending this line of research with non-student samples is a priority, as 
is developing more user-friendly and briefer methods of self-affirming. To this latter 
end there have been some promising manipulations in recent studies (Charlson et al., 
2007; Harris, et al., 2007; Jessop et al., 2009; Napper et al., 2009; Sherman, Cohen et 
al., in press).  
The persuasive messages have also typically targeted health threats that, on the 
whole, are both temporally and statistically remote for the samples of young people 
involved. This may render even the most serious of the communicated health-risks 
moderately rather than highly threatening. Future research needs to use more 
imminent hazards for the populations tested. Researchers should also attempt to 
measure the level of threat in studies, especially given suggestions that self-affirming 
backfires at high and low threat levels (van Koningsbruggen, 2009). Indeed, there 
may be potential risks in self-affirming that require close attention before it is used in 
any applied context. While boosts to judgmental confidence, self-certainty, self-
efficacy and related beliefs no doubt bring benefits in certain contexts and to certain 
people, such boosts may also pose hazards. For example, among those not at-risk for 
the targeted outcome, it may promote unwarranted judgmental confidence (e.g., 
Brinol et al., 2007). There is even evidence that those who are at-risk may show 
potentially detrimental reductions in risk perceptions for non-targeted risks (Harris & 
Napper, 2005).  
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Finally, the experimental paradigm used in the studies naturally encourages 
researchers to test for main effects of self-affirmation manipulations and their 
interactions. Yet, self-affirming may instead alter the relationships between variables 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006). Indeed, Klein and colleagues (e.g., Klein et al., 2001; 
Klein & Monin, 2009) have argued that self-affirming changes the basis on which 
people make judgments when threatened, rendering them more deductive (i.e., less 
data-driven) and potentially more rather than less defensive. There is evidence to 
support this (Klein et al., 2001). Clearly, this is another important but currently under-
researched aspect of the effects of self-affirming. We consider these issues further in 
the companion paper. 
Conclusions and future directions 
Overall, we believe the picture emerging from this nascent literature is encouraging: 
Self-affirming is clearly able to reduce the biased responses people display to 
uncongenial but important health-risk information. If the information merits it, at-risk, 
self-affirmed individuals are more likely to accept it and indicate an interest in 
changing their behaviour. Thus, self-affirming appears to encourage adaptive 
responding, reducing responses that minimise the negative emotional impact of the 
information (fear control) and promoting responses that may eventually reduce the 
danger (danger control).  
These findings both support and extend findings about the effects of self-affirming 
more generally. They support Sherman and Cohen’s (2006) claim that self-affirming 
opens people to ideas that would “otherwise be too painful to accept” (p. 205). 
Theoretically, it is proposed that it achieves these effects by providing resources or 
securing people’s self-perceptions, so that they are less concerned with the self-
evaluative implications of the information and therefore freer to engage with it less 
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defensively (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Sherman & Cohen, 2006) – perhaps because 
it engenders other-directed positive emotions (Crocker et al., 2008).  
Self-affirmation has the potential both to add to our understanding of the 
processes involved when people resist important but unwelcome information and to 
provide a means by which such resistance might be reduced. As well as having 
important theoretical implications, therefore, it offers researchers and practitioners the 
prospect of reducing the impact of defensive processing on health-related decision-
making and, in the process, overcoming a significant obstacle to health-behaviour 
change. It even raises the prospect of interventions to promote healthier behaviour 
that involve self-affirmation. 
Of course, there is much left to discover. In particular, the psychological 
mechanisms by which self-affirmation achieves its effects are not well understood. To 
this end, more measures of process are clearly needed, whether to understand how 
self-affirming promotes message acceptance or subsequently influences the process of 
health-behaviour change. Much also remains to be discovered about the moderators of 
these processes. We also need to understand the limits to the beneficial effects of self-
affirming before employing it as an intervention. We discuss these and other 
questions arising from this research further in a companion paper (Harris & Epton, 
2009). 
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